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"Fiduciary Capitalism," the "Political Model of Corporate Governance," and the Prospect of Stakeholder Capitalism in the United States

Economics Department, Franklin and Marshall College, P.O. Box 3003, Lancaster, PA 17604-3003, USA, david.brennan{at}fandm.edu

As progressive pension reforms seek to increase the opportunities for stakeholder involvement, they confront an existing set of class relations that by design exclude workers, retirees, and the state from real economic participation. This article argues that pension reforms must explicitly recognize the class underpinnings that jeopardize their success; proposes a workable, class-sensitive orientation for pension reforms; and includes the legislative context for governance reforms.

Key Words: pension funds • corporate governance

Review of Radical Political Economics, Vol. 37, No. 1, 39-62 (2005)
DOI: 10.1177/0486613404272327


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