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Post-Keynesian Theories of the Firm under Financialization

Cité Scientifique

^* To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: thdallery{at}hotmail.com.

	Abstract

Financialization is studied here from a microeconomic viewpoint. Following Stockhammer (2004a), the theory of the firm has been amended by introducing agency problems and class analysis between shareholders and managers. Further to that, I propose two alternative configurations for incorporation into the theory: the first views financialization as a constraint for the managerial firm, while the second discusses shareholders’ interests and integrates them as an end in itself for the finance-dominated firm. My conclusions focus on finance-oppressed accumulation, financial fragility, and potential macroeconomic instability.

First published on October 2, 2009, doi:10.1177/0486613409341371

Review of Radical Political Economics 2009;41:492.

A more recent version of this article appeared on December 1, 2009


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